In this paper, I invite my reader to assume a particular view of Karl Marx and his theories. In this view, we see Marx as a physician, treating an ailing society. Through our examination of his work, we will conclude that his diagnosis is keen; in fact keener than any before or since. However, his actual understanding of the disease is very limited, and his methods of treatment, where they exist, sadly misguided. I don’t want to condemn him for efforts, but nevertheless, his theoretical faults are real and dire.
We will proceed by summarizing Marx’s general position on the exploitation of labor by capital and his explanation of it by means of his positive economic theory. Our analysis will then focus precisely on the first chapter of the first volume of Capital, in which Marx attempts to render utility or use-value as a purely qualitative function of economic exchange. I hope to show that Marx’s positive economic analysis is doomed because utility is not merely qualitative but quantifiable; in fact, it is quantifiable in units of labor-time. With a reintroduction of use-value into the determination of an exchange-value, private property and markets for exchange become a necessary economic reality. Finally, the paper will conclude that despite this error in Marx’s thinking, that capitalism is, in fact, exploitative of labor. Thus, I will find that Marx’s conclusions ultimately prove correct, but not at all for the reasons he believed.
It is not clear, to me anyway, whether Marx’s theory of exploitation came as a result of his positive economic theorizing or whether his positive economic theory was devised to explain his theory of exploitation. What is clear is that Marx ultimately links the two in such a way that future scholars, both opponents and followers of Marx, have acted as though the theory of exploitation is contingent on Marx’s positive economics. The need to sever the causal relationship here is paramount. To begin then I’d like to describe both of these theories independently, that is without the implicit assumption that they are causally linked.
Marx’s theory of exploitation involves only the question of who has the right to the value of the fruit of human effort? For Marx, the answer is the same as it was for John Locke, the laborers and the laborers alone have a right to the value of the fruit of their labor. For Locke, this meant the ownership of the concrete object itself, but for Marx, it was abstracted to value the object represents. Marx saw that value, in this abstract form could be siphoned off through legal economic practices and in this Marx recognized exploitation. If the value of the manufactured object was solely produced by the laborer, then the laborer who was not being paid the full measure of value was being cheated.
How this value was created and how it was extracted needed to be explained and, if possible, proved. This was the work of Marx’s positive economic theory. His theory center’s around the labor theory of value. Marx’s labor theory of value–like that of Ricardo’s–finds its roots in Locke, who wrote,
For ‘tis not [merely] the Plough-man’s Pains, the Reaper’s and Thresher’s Toil, and the Bakers Sweat, is to be counted into the Bread we eat; the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, who digged and wrought the Iron and Stones, who felled and framed the Timber imployed [sic] about the Plough, Mill, Oven, or any other Utensils, which are vast Number, requisite to this Corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made Bread, must all be charged on the account of Labour, and received as an effect of that: Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves.
This idea of value as an account of labor, a tally of each hour spent in every pursuit minimally necessary for the creation of each useful thing produced by human industry is taken virtually unquestioned from Locke through to Marx. For simplicity’s sake, I’ll call this labor accounted for in the creation of a thing or commodity the labor of acquisition, which I define as labor necessary to bring about a commodity and deliver it into the hands of those who would use it. For Marx, the labor of acquisition is a sufficient cause for and the sole determinant of the full value of every commodity. Marx is alone in this. Locke, Ricardo, and other economists all believe that there is more to the determination of value than the labor of acquisition.
The advantage of Marx’s theory is that value can be objectively and empirically calculated, prior to markets of distribution. It is obvious that, if the value of any given thing was exactly equal to the minimum number of human labor hours necessary to bring about its possession then we can objectively measure the value of every particular thing by simply counting up all the hours. But there has always been a disadvantage associated with Marx’s cut and dry labor theory and that is use-value.
Political economists have–since Adam Smith at least–separated the value associated with the utility of an object, e.g. driving nails for a hammer or digging for a shovel, from the value it is said to exchange for with another object. The former being the object’s use-value and the latter its exchange-value. Smith and others suspected a relationship must exist between the two; however, by the time Marx was writing no one had yet to successfully formulate a theory showing how the two values related. If use-value is a factor in determining exchange-value, as was suspected, then the labor of acquisition is not sufficient to determine value. In other words, the central component of Marx’s positive economic theory, i.e. his labor theory of value, would be necessarily false. Where Marx to simply include use-values, he would have to reintroduce markets and establish private property as necessary economic conditions. Rather than do that, Marx opted to find a way to show that use-values were not a factor in value determinations.
Marx begins the first volume of Capital with a discussion of the commodity-form–that is a useful thing made for the purpose of exchanging it–which he considered the basic unit of capitalism. At the very beginning of his investigation into the political economy of capitalism, Marx writes that the usefulness or use-value of a commodity is “independent of the amount of labour required to appropriate its useful qualities,” and a few sentences later, “use-values are only realized in use or in consumption.” Now Marx realized, commodities, in order to exchange for each other at all, must have some common property, but Marx meant to prove that the value we associate with use, plays no part in determinations of appropriation of a thing (which recall is measured in labor), aside from the fact that it must have some use to even be considered worthy of appropriation. Thus, utility or use is not the common property of all commodities, according to him.
Marx then draws a bright line between subjective use-values and labor, dismissing the former as the valueless “material bearers” of exchange-value. Like Locke in the quotation above, Marx has determined the material part to be worthless except that it is necessary as a value-bearer. This role as value-bearer is unquantifiable, and so plays no part in the tallying of exchange-value. Marx holds that use-values “constitute the material content of wealth, whatever its social form may be”. By this he means that use-value is merely qualitative and has no value measurable in units, be they labor or anything else; it is–in Marx’s estimation–a function of the socially-determined, material form of the object. He expresses it again this way, “As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value”. He means that when we are evaluating commodities for the purpose of trade, their usefulness is not a factor in determining their value to us. Hence, Marx suggests use-values can and should be dismissed:
If then we disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour has already been transformed in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-value. It is no longer a table, a house, a piece of yarn or any other useful thing. All its sensuous characteristics are extinguished. Nor is it any longer the product of the labour of the joiner, the mason or the spinner, or of any other particular kind of productive labour. With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.
No one–as far as I know–questions Marx on this point. Marx’s brilliance in finding a way to reduce value to the labor of acquisition, which is objectively and empirically accountable (at least in theory) is undermined by his inadvertently eliminating labor as a concept distinct from mere physical activity from his labor theory of value.
To “disregard the use-value of commodities” is to assume that any random and purposeless physical action is labor. Labor, however, is purposeful activity aimed at the creation of some particular object for which a use is intended. Marx has abstracted use to being a property of a material thing, and in so doing he has missed use’s necessary relationship to laboring itself. To be able to disregard use, Marx must claim that material things can have a use-value, without necessarily having a particular end (viz. use) associated with them by any human being. That is to say that commodities may possess an abstract use, which requires no intention of any usage at all. But such a thing is self-contradictory because it asserts that uses exist which do not require a user. In other words, Marx is assuming here that although no human being has a use for a commodity, it may nevertheless possess an abstract utility (not a hypothetical one) which renders it a bearer of value as the product of labor.
Marx is entirely correct that use or use-value and the labor of acquisition are entirely distinct from each other, and that the latter is the concern of the producer while the former is the concern of the consumer. He is also right to claim that in order to exchange at all, objects must share a common substance. As we just saw Marx assumes that use has nothing to do with labor. But it is consumption and thus use that drives the intention behind labor. Without use, labor is indistinguishable from random physical activity. It is through labor that we can see use’s relationship to value beginning to emerge. Labor indeed is the common substance between all commodities, as Marx suspected, but labor itself is necessarily linked to use and so the use-value of commodities cannot be summarily disregarded without also disregarding labor from our theory of value.
To make this more concrete we might employ a simple reductio ad absurdum. According to Marx’s theory, all value is equal only to the labor of acquisition. Suppose now that you are tasked with digging a drainage ditch in your yard to protect your house from flooding. Now rather than dig up the yard with your bare hands you seek a tool to assist in the excavation. Now suppose that you find two digging objects that have the same labor that went into bringing them to you. One is a large stainless steel cooking spoon and the other a steel-headed wooden-handled shovel. Both of these commodities would be useful in digging up the yard, i.e. they would be better than using your hands, and both have the same labor of acquisition and so the same price at market. According to Marx’s theory then they both have a use and so can bear value and the value to you the consumer should be perfectly equal. Thus, since use-value is not a factor in determining value you should be just as likely to buy the spoon as to buy the shovel for digging the drainage ditch. This obviously absurd. The shovel is the better tool. But to even say the better tool some quantitative measure of use must be employed. If use can be quantitatively rendered, then use-values are not merely qualitative and simply the material form. And if this is the case then use-values may, and probably do constitute a factor in determining value.
What is useful about an object is precisely that it saves labor toward some intended end and how much. Marx’s divorce of the value of things–including things as commodities–from their material uses misses the obvious fact that to use a thing is synonymous with laboring with that thing and that laboring always has a use in mind. Thus, labor can be found in both directions from one’s situational relationship to a particular commodity. Just like every act of selling is an act of buying, so also is every act of valuing an act of appraisal of usage. The use-value differs from the labor of acquisition in that it is future-oriented and evaluates upcoming labor expenditures in which the object might be some measure of assistance. The labor of acquisition, as we well know, is past-oriented and evaluates the labor required to legally lay claim to the object that it may be used. These two labor evaluations are both necessary to sufficiently yield a final value determination or exchange-value. Value is recognized only in the combination of use-value and the labor of acquisition relative to the particular seller, buyer and the buyer’s task at hand.
Locke showed that human beings need to come to possess a thing in order to use it (i.e. acquisition through labor), but they also require a reason to come to possess it in the first place (i.e. they need an intention to use that thing). Also instructive here is Smith’s notion that labor itself carries both a utility and a disutility. While I grant Marx that use is only possible when there are possession and possession requires a certain amount of labor expended to obtain an object, that labor is not the only labor with which we associate the value of a commodity. The other labor involves the object’s deployment, i.e. it uses. How many hours will it take you to dig the ditch with your bare hands? How much less with the spoon? How much less with the shovel? If the shovel has less than the spoon and your hands it has a higher use-value. This use-value is then set against the cost of the labor of acquisition. If the shovel is so expensive, that it would require more hours of labor at another job for you to acquire it than it would take for you to dig the ditch with your bare hands, your interests would be best served by digging the ditch barehanded.
The problem Marx hoped to solve with socialized abstract labor is that different physical labors are qualitatively different from each other, so that–for example–tailoring is different from weaving. By abstraction, labor can be divested of its qualitative aspects leaving only its quantity, measured in labor hours. Physical labor is different from the general pool of hours available to all human beings of the same relative abilities. These temporal hours are all abstractly alike and so can be rendered merely quantitative, i.e. an hour of anyone’s labor-time is equal to an hour of everyone’s labor-time.
And this is true as far as the labor of acquisition is concerned; for when the the buyer is confronted by the commodity, the particular skills, tools, and substances of its creation are all equalized in an abstract averaging. There are exceptions, but those exceptions tend to fall on the side of use-value as opposed to the labor of acquisition. Note however that this averaging is only true from the perspective of the buyer. The seller rather sees the labor of acquisition as the lowest starting point of the object’s value, the minimum for which the commodity may be released; to the labor of acquisition, the seller always wishes to add the use-value of his would-be customer.
Socialized abstract labor is an average in the mind of the buyer, and as such, it cannot be individuated although it is individually generated. The effect is that socialized abstract labor appears as “one homogeneous mass of human labour-power”. This mass can be divided among the “world of commodities”–supposedly providing their exchange-values–but it is not individuated because it has been averaged. For example, if three workers produce use-values in x, y, and z quantities of physical labor-time, then their abstract labor would be the mean of x, y, and z. It would be a statistical error to then reassert that each worker produced one-third of that average. What can be asserted is that the commodities produced by the workers have a total labor of acquisition (from the point of view of the buyer) equal to the mean of x, y, and z.
To understand the problem with this averaging, we need only return the fact that when divorced of the link to use and use-values, all of the “productive expenditures of human brains, muscles, nerves, hands, etc.” are not in fact labor. What is deceptive in this quotation is Marx’s inclusion of the word “productive”, which attempts to sneak “use” back in where it was supposedly being disregarded. To be productive is to produce something, and by the expenditure of human power. With that broad definition, every action could be an act of socialized abstract human labor, including sleep which produces rest, or television-viewing which produces leisure. This interpretation of “productive expenditures” renders every hour indistinguishable from every other hour of every person. The only measure of socially necessary labor time, i.e. socialized abstract labor, would be the total amount of available hours for every conceivable human pursuit (viz. twenty-four a day) multiplied by the total number of human beings currently in existence. Another absurdity!
Surely Marx did not intend to reduce the meaning of “labor”–by socializing and abstracting it–to mere physical activity, any physical activity; instead, I imagine that he had some subset of physical activity that is purposeful. To be purposeful is to have an end in mind, and that is the same as saying that there is some use to the activity in that it brings about some end. Further, because this end is socialized, it cannot be just any end, but one that is socially defined (to be laborious). Thus, not all “productive expenditures” that take human hours constitute labor; labor is only the hours of “productive expenditure” devoted to completing a socially-defined work task. The “task” is necessary to distinguish labor from mere physical activity, which is to say that the qualitative aspect is what identifies the activity as labor. When Marx abstracts it away, we can no longer tell what is and is not labor. The “homogeneous mass of human labour-power” must include leisure hours as well as work hours. Clearly if leisure can be considered labor then the capitalists are contributing their fair share of socialized abstract labor to society, by handling all of its socially necessary leisure time.
Marx is sneaky with his words; the “socialized” in socialized abstract labor is meant to sneak “use” back in, for what could be socialized except the tasks labor is set to accomplish? This is not to condemn abstract labor, but merely to show that such abstractions can only be quantified at the subjective, individual perspective. To put it another way, I can count the number of hours it would take me to perform any kind of labor, because I–and I alone–know my relative abilities to complete a task. My estimation would need to include my skills, my knowledges, and my relative physical situation, along with any and all tools at my disposal. My present situation is vital. Consider that an apple on the tree five miles from you takes longer to gather than one growing right in front of you. The situation changes the labor of acquisition as well as use-value. Thus, only I can estimate the abstract labor-time necessary to complete a task and that estimation applies only to myself. These kinds of abstractions cannot be generalized, and so it is an error to socialize abstract labor as Marx has done. A subjective labor theory it stands to reason does not commit this error.
Before explaining the real problem, we should get a false problem out of the way. The fact that the market value is not fully derived from labor-input, i.e. there is a subjective component of value appraised by the consumer, does not defeat Marx’s complaint of exploitation. The value appropriated by the capitalist is merely the exchange-value already paid by the consumer; the use-value component of the consumer is not a factor between the laborer and the capitalist. The exchange-value cannot be realized until the price is already attained, in this sense the price is merely the actualization of the mutually agreed upon exchange-value of the buyer and seller. In order to keep the surplus-value the capitalist must be said to own the product before it is sold, i.e. the capitalist must also be the sole owner and seller of the product, and in order to ensure that there is a surplus-value the capitalist must ensure that the wages of the workers are below the price the commodity will fetch, whatever it will fetch. What exploitation occurs then, happens prior to the commodity every reaching the market, and is equal exactly to the extent of surplus-value, as Marx claimed. The subjective aspect of value-determination does not save the capitalist from a Marxist accusation of exploitation.
The real problem with Marx’s theory is that his explanation is not sufficient to prove the exploitation of the laborers. This is a result of the subjective component, for Marx’s argument is only sufficient if socialized abstract labor is solely responsible for the total value of a commodity. Now, I have no doubt that if the laborers are being exploited by capital, the mechanism Marx describes is the one by which it is taking place. But describing how workers could be exploited is a different thing from proving that they are being exploited. In order to prove that workers are being exploited–assuming a subjective labor theory in necessary as I have claimed–one would have to show that the individual laborers are fully entitled to the product of their labor; that is that laborers are the sole owners and sellers of the commodities they produce.
The difficulties this presents are more formidable than Marx understood. The socialized production system–the form of socialism or communism that Marx recommends–would not necessarily entitle the laborers to the full measure of the exchange-value of their product any more than capitalism would. If the products are common property or State property, Marx may have merely exchanged potential exploitation by capitalists for potential exploitation by demagogues and bureaucrats. Socialism and Communism, as Marx understands them, do nothing to protect the laborers–their labor being only an abstract part of the whole–every individual laborer is just as alienated and just as vulnerable. Without a theory proving that the individual laborers are solely entitled to the full value of their individual or collective productive input, Marx has yet to prove exploitation or provide a bulwark against it for workers.
Marx’s sense of the labor-process is incomplete without his understanding of the role of capital. To understand capital’s role we need to examine the “self-valorization” appearance of capital. “[C]apital is money, capital is commodities”, Marx said. Commodities must possess a useful aspect to have a value, and the use of capital–according to Marx–is Kapitalverwertung or self-valorization. Self-valorization is the appearance through the process of labor-production and exchange in which capital seems to conjure from itself a profit. Seen from a particular view-point a certain investment of capital yields a certain amount of return, which is above and beyond the value of the investment itself which is retained or reclaimed. In concrete terms, the use of capital qua capital is to yield a profit. To yield a “profit”, the value of the capital invested must itself be maintained. This is obvious, for if the investment depreciated correspondingly with the return–as David Ricardo believed–the loss of capital would equal the return. We might benefit by thinking of this as simply selling to the laborers, there would be no return beyond the price of the capital sold to (rather than invested in) the firm. The process by which capital self-valorizes is mysterious and still heavily debated today by economists. Marx’s theory reveals self-valorization to be a subterfuge from where the exploitation of labor results in profit, through the ownership of the means of production.
To elucidate this process, we may simply build on Marx’s basic model of exploitation given above. As the owner’s of the means of production, the capitalists’ lay claim to the products of labor. The product is sold for more than it cost the capitalist to produce creating a profit. This profit is appropriated by the capitalists thus valorizing their capital. Marx maintained that the market value was fixed at the socially minimal amount of labor necessary to produce the product and thus the only way the capitalist could extract a profit would be to pay the laborer’s less than the full amount of value their labor produced. Economic logic would prove that the more capital investment the more profit, and so the capitalist is likely to invest at least a portion of this profit into more capital. Thus perpetuating the cycle of capital reinvestment.
Marx recognized that the material use of capital is its ability to save labor, and by so doing increase the productivity of labor and cheapen commodities. The inherent conflict comes from the tendency–also noted by Ricardo–for wages to drop as a result. The laborers experience the increase of productivity as a reduction of the value of their labor, while the capitalist experiences the same as an increase in their profits, at least for a time. The conflicting interests of laborers and capitalists Marx details forms the basis for his belief in class warfare, which is inherent to the capitalist mode of production.
As a condemnation of capitalism, this argument is sufficient; but in order to correct the problem capitalism merely represents, we need to better understand the role of capital in production. Towards this end, we might assert that the value capital adds to a commodity (or a service or end of any kind) is in the labor it saves through its usage. This saved labor is necessarily different from the labor involved in the production of the capital itself. To put this in Marxian terms, we might argue that just as there is a difference between labor and labor power, capital, also, has differing costs and productive value capacities. A labor cost (the exchange-value of the capital) and a use-value (measurable in labor-saved) work much like labor and labor power; so while the average healthy laborer’s ability to produce value typically exceeds the cost of sustenance necessary to reproduce the laborer’s efforts, well-deployed capital has the ability to produce more labor-savings than the labor costs to produce and maintain it. History bears this out, since the whole productive increase of the industrial revolution is a testament to this fact.
The value of capital is equal to the reduction of the necessary labor required to meet some end, e.g. produce some thing or benefit from some service–its use-value–minus the labor cost of producing the capital–its exchange-value. Since, as Marx said, “capital is commodities”, all commodities are also capital; and thus, all commodities share this determination of value. This definition of value is a serious problem for the rest of Marx’s theories, but a major insight for us: use-values are quantifiable in units of labor-saved and are also necessary factors in the determination of a commodity’s value to a consumer, who must be the ultimate source of all economic evaluations in this theory. Keep in mind that this determination is necessarily subjective, although it can be plural, it is never communal or social.
Marx’s labor theory, which supposes that the value of a thing consists wholly in the labor that went into its construction, provided a technique for objectively calculating the absolute value of a thing without the need for markets. If his labor theory were correct, then it would follow that markets could be dispensed with, which is tantamount to saying exchange-value could be independently determined, as long as the quantity of (absolute) use-values, i.e. the material object themselves themselves, comprising the total social need could be determined. Without any need for market determination, money in such a system loses its function and may also go extinct, taking with it the irrational desire for endless accumulation, or what Marx’s perceived as avarice. Privatizing property for consumption becomes reducible to what we find useful as a society and nothing more, this would effectively restore natural checks and balances to the economic system while keeping modern production methods in place. This–I believe–is what Marx had in mind by “scientific socialism”. From where Marx sat, a society of modestly intelligent people, living and laboring in a particularly communal political arrangement should be able to assess and meet their own needs–as use-values–quite easily; thus the only thing holding back a just and equitable society of such individuals must be the oppressive historical development of capitalist greed; held in place by the tyrannical political force of the monopolists of the means of production, viz. the bourgeoisie.
Scientific utopia, then, wholly depends on just one thing: the ability to derive absolute value from the calculation of socialized abstract labor in a commodity, which I have just shown is not actually possible. Without it, scientific socialism is an impossibility because we can never determine the true value of things merely by accounting for their production labor. We need to incorporate use-values, which means, consumers fulfill the role of ultimately deciding for themselves how much a commodity is worth. Thus, markets and money will prove to be indispensable.
But all is not lost here. The upshot of capital having a use-value in saving labor is that the labor savings could potentially be made beneficial to the society at large, contingent on a restructuring of the economic order. Scientific socialism may be dead, but some flavor of socialism may yet prove triumphant. But to prove it, the real culprit behind economic oppression must first be identified.
To summarize then, Marx’s genius was to identify the mutual exclusivity of interests between capitalists and laborers and to recognize the exploitation of the laborers by the capitalists. His folly, on the other hand, was to develop a theory of value based entirely on labor that failed to recognized the necessary factor of use-value in total value determinations. I have attempted to show that use-value is a factor determining the exchange-value of all commodities at market and thus it is not the labor of production alone that determines value and price. I have also shown how the labor of production or what I call the labor of acquisition reduces the general value of a commodity on the market and so the lower the labor of acquisition, the more valuable the commodity. Use-values, contra Marx, are in fact quantifiable and serve as the positive value that allows consumers to spend more on a commodity than the labor of acquisition. Without the labor of acquisition as the sole determinate of value, most of Marx’s subsequent socio-political and economic theories fall apart. Nevertheless, I insist that capitalism is still exploitative and that the theory that proves it is yet to be addressed.
I believe that profit, rent, and interest are the real agents of economic oppression in the capitalist system. As a family of economic behaviors we might call these acts by the collective name of rent. Essentially, neither private property nor bourgeois greed, but rent that is the source of class conflict and exploitation in capitalism. Without going into the details, I want to briefly outline the structure of a non-Marxist theory of labor exploitation. While Marx’s theory based exploitation on positive economic theory, this theory bases it on the political right and social necessity of private property. In other words, the same theory that provides private property rights to the members of a society condemns rent as a practice just as surely as it condemns thievery.
The justification for a right to private property–according to John Locke–is based on the labor of acquisition and relies on the necessity of individual use and/or consumption. In other words, without the need to individually consume the property, the labor of acquisition is insufficient to bestow private property legitimation. The right of the landlord against the tenant farmer to the ownership of the farm land falls on the side of the tenant farmer who actually needs the land. Those who both need the land and do the work of acquiring it have a rightful claim. It follows from this that when the need to individually consume is dispensed with, the prior justification for ownership goes with it. One might only own private property when one both legitimately labored to earn it, and retains some need for its exclusive private usage.
So it is that rent, in any form, fails to justify ownership for the renter. The problem is obvious: when I lease out my object for money I give up my claim to a personal need to exclusively use that object. My claim then rests only on my legitimate possession of the object through some labor of acquisition. However, we just saw that this is inadequate. Further troubling the matter is the claim of the rentee, who does possess the back-ground need necessary to justify exclusive ownership. But the two aspects cannot be spread across two people, as exclusive rights must in fact be exclusive. If the property rights are shared between the renter and rentee, then the property in question is by definition common property, and neither party has an exclusive claim to it. This is all well and good, until a superfluous charge is made by the renter upon the rentee, i.e. the rent itself. In order to charge this rent, the renter would have to hold exclusive property rights upon the object being lent. But the act of lending itself simultaneously dissolves these rights. The actual ownership of the lent object is shared or common and no charge may be made to property the rentee has a fully justified claim too, i.e. the rentee “owns”.
The “use” of renting is not a legitimate use because it is self-defeating. To lend is to share property rights with another, to charge rent on shared property cannot be legitimated. And this is where capitalism is exploitative. Capitalism allows for rent in all its sundry forms. The most serious problem with capitalism has never been private property or greed or markets or money, but only the family of illegitimate economic procedures we call rent. Rent allows those with a claim of prior ownership to extort value from the value-generating labor efforts of those who use that capital. This extortion cannot be legitimated despite the fact that capitalism allows it. Here then is the source of economic inequality and oppression we find inherent in capitalist countries.